McCORMICK vs. MANINY.

return to a writ of habeas corpus detracts-in practice somewhat-

in theory very considerably-from its efficacy as a remedial process;
and yet, though defective as a remedy in some respects it be, in this
writ, known only to us and to our brethren of the United States of
America, we think we recognize the surest safeguard for the subject
against the license of the Crown-the most obvious and approved
pledge for the observance of that duty which is imposed on our
judges by those memorable words of Magna Charta--nuli vendemus, ntll negabimus, aut differemus, justitiam vel rectum-justice
shall neither be d,.ayed, denied, nor sold, but shall be administered
impartially to all.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, Northern District of
11finois, July Term, 1855.
CYRUS

E.
LMCORi9icK vs. JOHN H. IANNY, BT AL.

1. The plaintiff's first patent for a reaping machine being dated in 1834, has
expired, and whatever invention it contained now belongs to the public.
2. Improvements were made by McCormick for which, in 1845, he obtained a patent
and in 1847, a patent for a further improvement, which last patent was surrendered and re-issued in 1858.
3. A machine may consist of distinct parts, and some or all these parts may be
claimed as combinations. In such an invention, no part of it is infringed, unless
the entire combination or the part claimed shall have been pirated.
4. In his patent of 1845, for improvements in the reaping machine, the plaintiff
claimed the combination of the bow L, and dividing iron M, for separating the
wheat to be cut from that which is left standing, and to press the grain on the
cutting sickles and the reel. The defendant's wooden divider does not infringe
that claim of complainant's patent which embraces the combination of the bow
and dividing iron, as he does not use the iron divider which the plaintiff combined
with the wooden.
5. Where the plaintiff's patent calls for , reel post, set nine inches behind the cutters, which is,extended forward, and connected with the tongue of the machine to
which the horses are geared, it is not infringed by a reel bearer extending from
the hind part of the machine and sustained by one or more braces. The only
thing common to both devices is supporting the end of the reel nearest to the
standing grain. In their combinations and connections, and in everything else,
the devices are different.
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6. Where reaping machines prior to the plaintiff's invention had a grain divider or
reel post similar to the plaintiff's, the defendants may use the same without
infringing the plaintiff's patent.
7. The invention embraced in plaintiff's patents of 1847 and 1853 was not a raker's
sent, but it was the improvement of his machine, by which it was balanced, and
the shortening of the reel so that room was made for the raker's seat on the
extended finger-bar. This being his invention and claim, to this his exclusive
right is limited. Had he claimed generally a seat for the raker, the claim would
have been invalid, by reason of the prior knowledge and use of rakers' seats in
reaping machines. McCormick's raker's seat was new in its connection with his
machine; but his invention did not extend to a raker's seat differently arranged.
8. A mechanical equivalent is limited to the principle called for in the patent,
including colorable alterations or such as are merely changes as to form.
9. Manny's reaping machine does not infringe either of McCormick's patents. The
divider and reel bearer used in Manny's machine being different in form and
principle, do not infringe McCormick's patent of 1845.
10. The stand or position for the forker. invented and patented by John 1I. Manny,
is a new and useful improvement, and different in form and principle from
McCormick's patents of 1847 and 18-53.

This was a bill in chancery filed in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of Illinois, by Cyrus H.
McCormick against John H. Manny and others, charging them
with infringement of his Patents for improvements in the reaping
machine, dated January 31st, 1845, October 23d, 1848, re-issued in
May 24, 1853. The defendants filed their answer, setting up various grounds of defence, but relying chiefly on the defence that the
reaping machines manufactured and sold by them at Rockford,
Illinois, under the name of Manny's Reaper, differ in form and
principle from the improvements patented by McCormick, and that
the raker's stand or position was an improvement invented and
patented by John I-. Manny. I.sue being joined, a large volume
of testimony was taken, showing the state of the art of making
reaping machines before and after the date of McCormick's patents.
The cause standing for hearing on the bill, answer, exhibits and
testimony, it was by agreemicl. of counsel heard at Cincinnati in
Septembcr 1853, before the Honorable John McLean, Circuit Judge,
and the Honorable Thomas Drummond, District Judge of the United
6tates for the Northern District of Illinois, and was argued for
the complainant by Reverdy Johnson and E. N. Dickerson, Esq'rs.,
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and for the defendants by Edwin 1. Stanton and George Harding,
Esq'rs.
On behalf of the complainant it was submitted that Letters Patent had been granted to the complainant January 31st, 1845, for
improvements in reaping machines. Ia this patent, among other
things, there was described and claimed a device for dividing and
separating the grain to be cut from that which was to be left standing, as the machine passed around the grain field, and also a device to support the end of the reel on the side nearest to the standing grain, so that the cut grain could be brought freely on the platform of the machine. Another patent was granted to the complainant October 23d, 1847, and re-issued to him, on an amended specification, May 24th, 1853. This patent specified and claimed an
improvement for supporting the raker's body on the machine while
he raked off the cut grain and deposited it in gavels on the ground,
at the side of the machine. It was contended that the defendants
had made and sold for the harvest of 1854, eleven hundred reaping
machines, and for the harvest of 1855, three thousand reaping machineb, in all of which there were devices for dividing and separating
the grain, for bearing up the reel and devices for supporting the
raker, substantially the same as were specified and claimed by the
complainant. A decree of a perpetual injunction and an account
of profits, were asked for.
On behalf of the defendants it was submitted, that prior to the
date of complainant's inventions and patents, various devices for
dividing and separating grain had been described, patented, or used,
and on this point especial reference was made to the machines of
Dobbs, Cummings, Bell, Phillips, Duncan, Randall, Schnebly, Hussey, Ambler, and others. That anterior to the same date reaping
machines, containing devices for bearing up the reel out of the way
of the cut grain, had been described, patented or used, by Cummings,
Bell, Ten Eyck, Phillips, Duncan, Schnebly and Randall.
And that prior to McCormick's invention, devices for supporting
the raker's body had been used in the machines of Hussey, Randall, Schnebly, Woodward, Nicholson and Hite. Defendants' counsel contended that McCormick's patents of 1845, 1847, and 1853
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on their face, purport to be for special improvements in the specific
machine patented by him in 1834, and not for the discovery of any
new principle, method, or combination for reaping, in general. His
exclusive right is, therefore, limited to the specific improvements he
invented, described, and claimed in his patent.
The Patents for these improvements are to be construed in reference to the general state of the art; to McCormick's prior inventions;
and to the particular description of his improvements, and the specification of his claim; and so that, while securing him the exclusive
right contemplated by law, at the same time to guard against his withdrawing from the public anything before discovered, known, or used
by others, or that was contained in his original patent. For a patentee
has no right to extend the term of his monopoly over anything embraced in his original invention, under color of some improvement
on it.
The claims for the seat, the reel-post, and the divider, are efforts
to acquire a monopoly of the reaping machine, by enlarging, modifying, and changing the description and specification of particular
improvements, and expanding them so as to cover principles,
methods and results, in violation of the principles and avowed policy
of the patent laws. And the result aimed at by the complainant
would withdraw from the public the contribution of many minds,
and subject an instrument of great public utility to a private
monopoly, without even a decent color of right.
The merit claimed for McCormick, of being the first man who
brought the reaping machine into successful use, was wholly aside
from the present question. For, even if that merit justly belonged
to McCormick, it is not the ground on which the patent law confers
an exclusive right to the machine. And, besides, it could only extend to his own improvements ; whereas, to the principal parts constituting the machine, he has not the shadow of any claim, as
inventor.
The opinion of the court was delivered at Washington, on the
16th of January, by Mr. Justice McLean: as follows.
This is a bill to restrain an alleged infringement of the plaintiff's
patent, by the defendants, and for an account.

McCORMICK vs. MANNY.

By consent of parties, the case was adjourned from Chicago to
Cincinnati, at which place it was argued on both sides, with surpassing ability and clearness of demonstration. The art involved in
the inquiry was traced in a lucid manner, and shown by models and
drawings, from its origin to its present state of perfection. And if
in the examination of the cause, the entire scope of the argument
shall not be embraced, no inference should be drawn that the court
was not deeply impressed with the artistical researches and ingenuity of the counsel.
It is proper that I should say here, after the close of the argument at Cincinnati, no time was afforded for consultation with my
brother judge. At my request he has lately transmitted to me his
opinion on the points ruled, without any interchange of views between
us, and there is an entire concurrence on every point stated.
Cyrus H. McCormick a citizen of Virginia, represented to the
Patent Office, that he had " invented a new and useful improvement in the machine for reaping all kinds of small grain," which
improvement was not known nor used before his application, on
which he obtained a patent dated the 21st of June, 1834. As that
patent has expired, and whatever of invention it contained now
belongs to the public, no further notice of it in this place is necessary. The same individual, on representing to the patent office,
that he had invented certain new and useful improvements on the
above machine, obtained a patent for those improvements, dated the
81st of January, 1845.
After describing certain improvements in the cutting apparatus,
the divider, and the reel post, he makes the following claim:
1. The curved (or angled downward, for the purpose described,)
bearer for supporting the blade in the manner described.
2. The reversed angle of the teeth of the blade, in manner
described.
3. The arrangement and construction of the fingers (or teeth for
supporting the grain) so as to form the angular spaces in front of
the blade, for the purpose described.
4. The combination of the bow L and dividing iron M, for separating the wheat in the way described.
5. Setting the lower end of the reel-post (R) behind the blade,
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curving it at R 2 , and leaning it forward at the top, thereby favoring
the cutting, and enabling him to brace it at top by the front brace
(0,,) as described, which he claims in combination with the post.
And afterwards, McCormick applied for another patent, for improvements made on his reaping machine patented in 1845, and it was
issued to him the 23d of October, 1847.
This patent was inoperative, as the patentee afterwards alleged,
by reason of a defective specification; and he surrendered it, and
obtained a corrected patent the 24th of May, 1853. In his specifications of this patent, he says, "the reaping machines heretofore
made may be divided into two classes. The first class having a
seat for a raker, who, with a hand rake equal in length to the
width of the swath cut, performs the double office of gathering the
grain to the cutting apparatus and on to the platform, and then
of discharging it from the platform on the ground behind the
machine."
The defects of the first class were remedied, he says, by the
second class, in which a reel was employed to gather the grain to
the cutting apparatus, and deposit it on a platform, from whence it
is raked off by an attendant, who deposits the grain on the ground
by the side of the machine, where it can lay as long as desired; the
whole width of the swath being left unencumbered for the passage
of the horses on the return of the machine to cut another swath.
And he states that the length of the reel leaves no seat for the
raker, who has to walk on the ground at the side of the machine and rake
the grain from the platform, and, he says the weight of the machine
is too great, back of the driving wheel. For these defects he has
provided a remedy by his improvements, which places the driving
wheel back of the gearing that gives motion to the sickle, which is
placed in a line behind the axis of the driving wheel and the coggearing, which moves the crank forward of the driving wheel, so as
to balance the frame of the machine with the raker on it. And
also in combining with the reel, which deposits the grain on the
platform, a seat, or position for the raker to sit or stand, so that he
may rake off the grain, thrown upon the platform by the reel, on
the side of the machine farthest from the standing grain.
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And in the conclusion he says, "what I claim as my invention,
and desire to secure by letters patent, as improvements on the reaping machines secured to me by letters patent dated the 24th of June
1834, and the 31st of January 1845, is placing the gearing and
crank forward of the driving wheel for protection from dirt, &c., and
thus carrying the driving wheel further back than heretofore, and
sufficiently so to balance the rear part of the frame, with the raker
thereon; when this position of the parts is combined with the sickle
back of the axis of motion of the driving wheel, by means of the
vibrating lever, substantially, as herein described."
And he claims "the combination of the reel for gathering the
grain to the cutting apparatus, and depositing it on the platform,
with the seat or position for the raker, arranged and located as described, or the equivalent thereof, to enable the raker to rake the
grain from the platform, and lay it on the ground, at the side of
the machine.
The defendants in their answers deny the validity of the plaintiff's patent for want of novelty, and on other grounds; but in
their argument they disclaim any such purpose; and place their
defence on a denial of the infringement charged. The infringemcnt
of the plaintiff's machine by the defendants is alleged to consist in
his divider, reel-post and its connections, and the raker's seat.
The fourth claim in the plaintiff's patent of 1845, is "the combination of the bow L and dividing iron M, for separating the wheat
in the way described." He describes the divider "as an extension
of the frame on the left side of the platform, three feet before the
blade, for the purpose of separating the wheat to be cut from that
to be left standing, and that whether tangled or not." This divider
gradually rises from the forward point, with an outward curve or
bow, so as to throw off the grain to the left, and thus separate it
from the grain to be cut. And this is combined with a dividing
iron rod or bar, made fast by a bolt to the timber extended, as a
divider, which bolt also fastens the bow.
From this bolt the iron rises towards the reel at an angle of thirty
degrees, until it approaches near to it, when it is curved to suit the
circle of the reel. This iron is adjustable to suit the lowering or
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elevation of the reel, by a bolt and slot in the lower end. By its gradual rise, this iron divider elevates the tangled grain, and presses it
against the cutting sickles of the machine.
There can be no doubt that this combination of the bow and iron
divider, as claimed, is new, it not having constituted a part of any
reaping machine prior to the complainant's.
In the specifications of the defendant's patents, he says, "the
divider F. projects on the left side of the machine in advance of the
guard fingers, and divides the grain to be cut from that which is to
be left standing &c., and the mrcline constructed under his patent
has a wooden projection, somewhat in the form of a wedge, extending beyond the cutting sickles some three feet; and which, from the
point in front, rises as it approaches the cutting apparatus, with a
small curve, so as to raise the leaning grain and bring it within the
reel on the inner side of the divider, and on the outer side by the
projection, to disentangle the heads and stalks, so as to leave them
with the standing grain.
This is not dissimilar in principle from the wooden divider of the
plaintiff's machine, the curve outward maybe less, and the elevation
from the point which enters the grain may also be less than McCormick's, but it performs the same office, and in principle they may
be considered the same, and the question necessarily arises, whether
in this respect, this divider is not an infringement of the plaintiff's
patent.
A satisfactory answer to this inquiry, is not difficult.
The plaintiff claims his wooden divider in combination with the
iron rod on the inner side, and which rises from its fastening at the
angle of thirty degrees. The adjustability of this iron, by giving
it a lower or higher elevation, is also important, and would of itself
be a sufficient ground for a patent. But in this inquiry, the adjustability of the iron divider is not important, as it may be considered
stationary.
A patent, which claims mechanical powers or things in combination, is not infringed by using a part of the combination.
To this rule there is no exception. If, therefore, the wooden divider of the defendant's machine, be similar to that of the plaintiff's,
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there is no infringement; as the combination is not violated in
whole but in part. But there is another, and an equally conclusive
answer, to the objection.
The plaintiff's wooden divider was not new, and therdfore, could
be claimed only ii combination. The English patent of Dobbs in
1814, had dividers of wood or metal. The outer diverging rod of
Dobbs' divider rises as it extends back, and at the same time diverging laterally from the point of the divider, acts the same as the
McCormick divider of 1845, to raise stalks of grain inclining inwards, and to turn them off from other parts of the machine.
The English patent of Charles Phillips, in 1841, had a dividing
apparatus, consisting of a pointed wedge-formed instrument, which
extended some distance in advance of the cutting apparatus and
reel; its diverging inner side, like the corresponding side of
McCormick's divider of 1845, bears inward, upright grain within the
range of the reel and cutting knives; while at the same time, its
outer diverging edge, like the outer edge of McCormick's divider,
bears off standing grain without the range of the reel. And there
is an inclined bar, which being attached by its front to the lower
piece extends backwards and upwards, until it meets the frame of
the machine, at a point above and behind the cutting apparatus.
Ambler's machine had also a divider, not dissimilar to the defendant's.
Bell's machine, made in 1828, had dividers on it to press the grain
away from the machine on the outer side, and on the inner side to
press it to the cutters.
Hussey's machine too, had a point which projected into the grain,
and dividing it before the cutting knives, the inside to be cut, the
outside to remain with the standing grain.
In Schnebly's machine, the grain to be cut was separated from
that which was left standing, by a divider projecting on the side of
the machine.
In the plaintiff's patent of 1884, he says, "1on the left end of the
platform is a wheel of about fifteen inches diameter, set obliquely,
bending under the platform to avoid breaking down the stalks, on an
angle that may be raised or lowered by two moveable bolts, as the
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cutting may require, corresponding with the opposite sides. The projection of the frame at this end is made sufficiently to bear off the
gr:in from the wheel, and he claims "the method of dividing and
keeping separate the grain to be cut from that to be left standing."
This patent having expired, whatever of inve-ition it contained
now belongs to the public, and may be used by any one. The inner
line of the projecting divider of the defendant's machine, it is contended, has a gradual rise from the point; which answers the purpose of the iron divider of Mr. McCormick's to crowd the grain on
the reel and cutters; but, in this respect, the wooden divider of the
defendant's is not materially different from those above referred
to, and others in use, before the plaintiff's patent of 1845.
In regard to the divider in the defendant's machine, it is clear,
that it cannot be considered as an infringement of the plaintiff's
patent.
The reel-post, as claimed, with its connections, by the plaintiff,
seems not to have been infringed by the defendant.
In defendants' machine the end of the reel, next the standing
grain, is supported by an adjustable arm, which is nearly level,
slightly inclined upwards, and supported by a standard towards the
rear of the machine. In McCormick's patent of 1845, the reel-post
is set back of the cutter, some nine inches at its foot, rising upwards
and projecting forwards, and supported at its top by a brace running to and connected with a standard on the tongue of the machine.
The reel-post of the defendant is substantially like the one in Bell's
reaping machine, and also the patent granted to James Ten Eyck,
in 1825. The reel-support or bearer of the latter has not the features
of vertical and horizontal adjustibility contained in the reel-bearer of
the defendant's; but it is attached to the machine behind the platform on which the cut grain is received, and it extends forward to
hold the reel, and to leave the space beneath it unobstructed.
In his patent of 1884, McCormick placed his reel-post before the
cutting apparatus, standing perpendicularly, and being braced as
described. But in the patent of 1845, that post was set nine inches
behind the sickles, leaning forward so as to bring the part of it
which supported the reel to its former perpendicular, the post still
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extending forward so as to admit of being braced directly to the
tongue of the machine to which the horses are harnessed.
This was rendered necessary, as the first post being in advance of
the cutter, encountered the fallen grain, which adhered to it, and
clogged the machine.
The reel-post, so called, in both these machines, were alike only
as bearers of the end of the reel next to the standing grain; but
their structures in every other respect are different. McCormick's
reel-post served as a brace to the machine, its foot being morticed
into the left sill of the machine, nine inches behind the cutting
sickles, its top, leaning forward, was braced to the tongue of the machine. The defendant's reel-post, like that of Bell's, was connected
with the hindmost post of the machine, and was sustained by braces,
as the reel bearer.
In giving strength to the machine it was unlike the plaintiff's,
and if this were not so, the defendant's is sustained by similar reelposts in other machines, prior to McCormick's.
But in addition to these considerations, the plaintiff claims his reelpost in combination with the tongue of the machine, as described.
There is no pretence that this combination has been infringed.
From the structure of McCormick's reaper, it was impossible to
find a seat for the raker, without an adjustment of the machine
which should balance it with the weight of the raker behind the
driving wheel. For this purpose the gearing and crank were placed
further forward, the finger piece was extended, and the reel
shortened, so as to make room for the raker, and enable him to discharge the grain at the side of the machine, opposite to the standing
grain. This improvement was claimed as a combination of the reel
with the seat of the raker.
In his specifications to the patent of 1853, McCormick describes
two classes of machines, the first class having a seat for a raker who,
with a hand-rake, having a head equal in length to the width of the
swath cut, performs the double purpose of gathering the grain to
the cutting apparatus and on to the platform, and then of discharging from the platform behind the machine. This was defective,
principally, he says, because the grain was discharged behind in
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the wake of the machine, rendering it necessary to remove the grain
before the return of the machine, and he alleges these defects are
obviated by his improvement. In the specifications to John LT.
Manny's patent, of the 6th of March,1855, he says, after referring
to McCormick's, Schnebly's, Woodward's and Hite's machines, in
regard to the seats of the rakers, "the improvement of mine consists,
in combining with the reel, which gathers the grain to the cutting
apparatus, and deposits it on the platform, a seat or position arranged
between the inner end of the platform and the end of the machine
next the standing grain, for an attendant to sit or stand on, and
which gives due support to him while operating a fork to push the
cut grain towards the outer end of the platform, where the grain is
first compressed against the wing or guard provided for the purpose,
and then by a lateral movement of the fork discharged properly on
the ground behind the platform, in gavels, ready to be bound into
sheaves."
And in the summing up, the defendant, Manny, says, "what I
claim is the combination of the reel for gathering the grain to the
cutting apparatus and depositing it on the platform, with the stand
or position of the forker, arranged and located as described, or the
equivalent thereof, to enable the forker to fork the grain from the
platform, and deliver and lay it on the ground at the rear of the
machine, as described."
With a few verbal alterations, this claim is the same as made by
the plaintiff, with the exception of the seat of the raker, and the
place of deposit for the grain.
It must be admitted that the combination of the raker's seat with
the reel, as claimed by the plaintiff, was new. And a very important question arises, how far this claim extends. Is it limited to the
mode of organization specified, or may it be considered as covering
the entire platform of the machine, and all combinations of the seat
and reel ?
The reel was not new, nor was a seat on the platform, or connected
with the platform, for the raker, new; but the position for the raker,
as described by McCormick, was new. Mr. Justice Nelson, in the
case of McCormick vs. Seymour & Morgan, in his charge to the
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jury said, "the seat was the object and result he was seeking to
attain, by the improvement which he supposed he had brolight out.
What he invented was the arrangement and combination of
machinery which he has described, by which he obtained his seat.
That, and not the seat itself, constituted the essence and merit, if
any, of the invention."
The reel was advanced in front of the cutters, and shortened, and
the driving wheel was put back and the gearing forward, so as to
balance the machine with the weight of the raker on the extended
finger piece. In this peculiar organization, the improvement of
McCormick consisted. It was adapted to no other part of the
machine.
To place the raker on any other part of the platform or machine
of 2NcCormick, than on the extended finger bar, %iild derange
its balance, which was so well adjusted by the improvements described. No such change can be made without experiment and
invention; consequently, the improvement of the plaintiff, in this
respect, is limited to his specification.
In 1844, Hite made a new and useful improvement on lcCormick's reaping machine, patented in 1884, by attaching thereto a
seat mounted on wheels, for a raker to occupy when raking the
grain from the platform, on which it is deposited by the reel. And
a patent was issued in 1855, for this improvement, although from
the evidence, the presumption was, that the improvement had gone
into public use more than ten years.
William Schnebly, at Hagerstown, from 1825 to 1887, constructed
reaping machines. At first a revolving apron was used, but this
was discontinued, and after the grain had been thrown on the platform by the reel and the proper motion of the machine, he says he
sat upon the machine in rear of the platform, sometimes upon the
guard board, and sometimes astride a cap or cross beam, suitable
for that purpose, and raked off the grain with a three or four pronged
fork, from the platform, and deposited it on the ground at the side of
the machine.
In the specifications of Woodward's machine, patented in 1845,
he says, the raker stands upon the platform L, and as the grain is
19
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cut and falls upon the platform, he with a fork or rake conveys it
to the hinged box, and when a quantity is accumulated therein sufficient, the rear end of the box falls and deposits the wheat on the
ground in the form of a gavel. This box was often dispensed with.
The raker rode on the machine.
In 1844, Nicholson represented that he had made an improvement on a machine for cutting grain, &c., and he says, "the machine is provided with a pair of shafts, L, for the animal to draw
by, and a place, A, for the driver to sit on, and a suitable stand for
a raker's seat." And as a part of his improvement he claims a mode
of depositing the grain in a line out of the track of the horse, as
described. In 1855 a patent was issued for this improvement, to
the administrator of Nichols6n.
In Abraham Randall's patent, dated in 1833, the grain was raked
off the machine by a raker, wh,. had a seat on the platform. This
part of the machine succeeded well. When a sufficient amount of
grain was collected on the platform, to make a sheaf, it was raked
off the side. The machine was in use several years.
The platform of the defendant's machine, is different from that of
the plaintiff's. The latter is constructed so that the side next to
the reel and the cutting knives, is parallel with them, while Manny's
platform is so constructed as to extend back from the cutters in a
diagonal form, which brings its hindmost part, through which the
grain is discharged, to the right of the swath cut.

This leaves the

way open for the machine in cutting the next swath. The raker, in
this machine, occupies a place behind the running ground wheel at
the rear of the divider, with his face quartering to the horses.
Whether we look at the structure of the platforms, or the position
of the rakers, no two things could be more unlike than the two
machines of the plaintiff and defendant. Do they differ in principle,
as well as in form? To provide for McCormick's raker the structure
of the machine had to be altered materially, by changing the heavy
machinery so as to balance it with the weight of the raker on the
extended finger board The reel had also to be shortened.
On Manny's machine the raker occupies a place diagonal to that
of McCormick's, and at the farthest part of the platform next to the
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standing grain. He stands not upon the extended finger board, but
on the platform, requiring no shortening of thereel, nor balancing
of the machine.
From the patents above referred to, it appears that before the
last improvement of McCormick, rakers had been placed upon the
machine, intended to perform the same office as McCormick's rakers,
It is no answer to this fact to show that some of these plans were
abandoned or superseded by the progress of improvement. They
were embodied in patents, and were not only publicly constructed
and used, but the models of the machines were deposited in the
patent office, and the patents, with their specifications and drawings,
were matters of public record.
Now if these various plans of seatig a raker on the machine, as
called for in other patents prior to that of McCormick's, did not
affect the validity of his subsequent patent, it could hardly be contended that his patent excludes all subsequent improvements for a4
raker's seat. In the case of Mcormick vs. Seymour & Morgan,
Mr. Justice Nelson argues very properly in saying, "it is insisted
on the part of the learned counsel for defendants, that there is
nothing new in this, because there is in the machine of Hussey a
seat, or, what is equivalent, a position for the raker, in which he
may stand and rake off the grain. The seat, that is the position on
the platform, is, in one sense, undoubtedly common to both. But
Hussey's machine has no reel to interfere with the raking, and the
grain, instead of being raked from the platform, is pushed from the
back part of it. The question is, whether the arrangement of the
seat, the combination by which the patentee obtains and can use the
seat or position, is similar to or substantially like the contrivance in
Hussey's machine. That is the point. The mere fact that a seat
was used in previous reapers, does not embrace the idea contained
in this patent. That view could only be material under the assumed
construction given by the learned counsel for the defendants to the
patent, that it is for a seat. If that were the thing invented and
claimed by the patentee, then the seat of Hussey would be an
answer to the claim."
"There is also another point, says the learned judge, to which it
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is proper to call your attention in this connection, and which has
been the subject of discussion by the counsel, and that is, that Hussey, in the construction of his machine in Ohio, at a very early day
used a reel in connection with his cutter and a raker. It is insisted
that this use of the reel, in connection with a raker, in Hussey's
machine, before the discovery of the plaintiff, destroys his claim to
originality. In answer to this it is claimed, on the part of the
counsel for this plaintiff, that the contrivance of Hussey, into which
the reel was introduced, was substantially different from the plaintiff's contrivance. It appears that Iussey's reel, like the reel of
the plaintiff, when his first seat was put on in 1845, interfered with
the raker, so as to prevent his raking the grain the whole length of
the platform. Hence Iussey had an endless apron, by which the
grain, when cut, was deposited at the feet of the raker, so that he
could shove it off with his rake."
I have cited largely from the learned judge, not only because the
opinion was greatly relied on by the plaintiff's counsel in the argument of this case, but for the reason that the opinion is sound.
The reel it seems interfered with Hussey's plan, which was obviated
by an endless apron. McCormick dispensed with the apron by
putting back the driving wheel and placing forward the gearing, &c.,
so as to balance the machine, which, with the shortening of the reel,
completed his improvement.
Now, if a raker be seated on a different part of the machine, and
where he can rake without balancing the machine, and without interruption from the reel, it is a contrivance and an invention substantially different from McCormick's. To seat the raker on
Manny's machines does not require the same elements of combination that were essential in McCormick's invention. His invention
in procuring a seat for the raker, being new and useful, was unaffected by those which preceded it. But Manny's contrivance required no such modification and combination of the machinery, for
a raker's seat, as McCormick's; it is consequently substantially
different from his. The seat was not the thing invented, but the
change of the machinery, to make a place for it. And where the
seat may be placed on the platform, or on any part of the machine,
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which does not require substantially the same invention and improvement as McCormick's, there can be no infringement of his right.
In McCormick's claim for the improvements which gave him a
seat for the raker, arranged and located as described, he adds, "or
the equivalent therefor."
The words of this claim, "or the equivalent therefor," cannot
maintain the claim to any other invention, equivalent or equal to
the one described. This would be to include all improvements or
modifications of the machine, which would make it equal to McCormick's. This part of the claim cannot be construed to extend to
any improvements, which are not substantially the same as those
described, and which do not involve the same principle. It embraces all alterations which are merely colorable. Such alterations
in a machine, afford no ground for a patent.
As stated by Mr. Justice Nfelson, the improvement of McCormick
consisted, not in the seat for the raker, but in the modification and
new combination of parts of his machine, so as to secure a place for
a seat. Had a construction of the seat merely, been the invention,
that learned judge admitted the prior seat for the raker on Hussey's
machine, would have nullified the claim.
Having arrived at the result, that there is no infringement of the
plaintiff's patent, by the defendant, as charged in the bill, it is
announced with the greater satisfaction, as it in no respect impairs
the right of the plaintiff. He is left in full possession of his invention, which has so justly secured to him, at home and in foreign countries, a renown honorable to him and to his country-a renown
which can never fade from the memory, so long as the harvest\
home shall be gathered.
The bill is dismissed at the costs of the complainant.

ASHFORD vs. EWING.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, January, 1856.
ASIIFORD VS. EWING.

The Orphans' Court having exclusive jurisdiction of the distribution of the estates of
decedents in the hands of executors and administrators among those entitled
thereto, an action cannot be brought in a court of common law by a distributee
under the intestate laws to recover his share of the personal estate of a decedent
from the administrators.

This case was heard upon a writ of error to the Court of Common
Pleas of Beaver County. The facts of the case are stated in the
opinion of the court, which was delivered by
LEwis. C. J.-This is an action brought by a child, who was
born about six months after the death of Samuel Ewing, to recover
a distributive share of the estate of the decedent. The administrators had settled an account, which was confirmed on the 3d of June,
1834, exhibiting a balance of $468 94 in favor of the estate. There
was no decree of distribution in the Orphans' Court. The Court of
Common Pleas decided that since the Acts of 1832, 1833, 1834,
and 1836, taken collectively, exclusive jurisdiction to enforce distribution belongs to the Orphans' Court, and that the plaintiff cannot recover in this action at common law.
It would be a waste of time to attempt to explain or review all
the decisions on cases supposed to be governed by the law as it
existed before the act of 1832. That act not only gives jurisdiction
to the Orphans' Court in cases of this kind, but prescribes the manner in which that jurisdiction shall be exercised. The act of 5th
March, 1836, requires that the statutory remedy shall be strictly
pursued, and prohibits a resort to the provisions of the common
law, further than shall be necessary for carrying the remedy provided by statute into effect. It is therefore plain that if we pay
any attention to the positive enactments of the Legislature, the
present action cannot be sustained. After the statute gave a
remedy for a ward against his guardian by the settlement of his
accounts in the Orphans' Court, it was held, that the action at common
law was taken away. Bowman vs. -Herr's-Executors,1 Pa. Rep. 282.
After the act of 18341 gave a remedy in the Orphans' Court for the
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collection of legacies charged on real estate, it was determined that
the statutory remedy must be pursued. Downer vs. Downer,
9 Watts, 60: Craven vs. Bleakney, 9 Watts, 19: Strickland vs.
Sheaffer, 5 Barr, 240: Mohler's Appeal, 8 Barr, 29. On the
same principle, it has been decided that a widow cannot maintain
an action of dower, where her husband died seised and in possession,
so as to give the Orphans' Court jurisdiction, which jurisdiction was
declared to be exclusive. Thompson vs. Simpson, 3 Ba-r, 60.
Nor can the heirs maintain ejectment against the widow. Their
remedy is exclusively in the Orphans' Court. Seider vs. Seider,
5 Wharton, 208. Nor can a vendee resort to the common law
action of ejectment, to enforce specific execution of a parol contract
for a sale of land by a deceased vendor. His remedy is confined to
that given by statute in the Orphans' Court. Myers vs. Black,
5 Harris, 193.
It was expressly decided in Eittera's -Estate, 5 Harris, 422, that
the Orphans' Court, by statute, is clothed with authority to distribute
the estates of decedents in the hands of executors or administrators,
"among the persons entitled to the same ;" and that by these general terms, as well as by express words, the legislature embraces
creditors as well as heirs next of kin and legatees. 5 Harris, 422-3.
The same principle had been previously announced in Barklay's
-Estate,10 Barr, 387. In Whiteside vs. Whiteside, 8 Harris, 474,
it was declared that "4if there be anything besides death which is
not to be doubted, it is that the Orphans' Court alone has authority
to ascertain the amount of a decedent's property and order its distribution among those entitled to it." In ,Siollenberger'sAppeal,
it was distinctly affirmed that the Orphans' Court, within its appointed orbit, is a court of exclusive jurisdiction. 9 Harris, 341.
The inconveniences and expenses arising from an action at common law by each person entitled to a distributive share were so
great as to induce the legislature to prescribe a remedy in the
Orphans' Court, where the whole estate can be distributed in one
proceeding, and by a single decree. In the present case, where the
sum is only $468 94, to put each of the distributees to the expense
of a separate action to enforce distribution, would be to exhaust the
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fund in the effort to secure it. If the Acts of Assembly, the decisions since their enactment, or the convenience of the parties and
the courts are to be regarded, this judgment must be affirmed.
Our attention has been particularly called to the cases of Bichardson vs. Bichardson, 9 Barr, 428, and aeddis vs. irvine, 5 Barr,
508 as standing in opposition to this view of the question of jurisdiction. In the case last named, the demand was not against the
executors as such, nor for assets of the decedent at all. In the
case first named the decedent settled his account in 1818, long before
the jurisdiction was established on the footing of the act of 1832.
In neither of the cases did the parties make the point *which has
been considered in the present adjudication.
It is time that this question should be considered settled.
Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Court of -Pennsylvania, January, 1856.
Before Mr. Justice

WOODWARD,

sitting at Nisi Prius.

JAMES 0. WHEEDEN vs. THE CAMDEN & AMBOY RAILROAD CO.
1. Under the present state of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, a corporation is notper sea "citizen within the meaning of the third article of the constitution, which gives jurisdiction to the federal courts over contraversies between "citizens of different states." But where a corporation sues or
is sued, its governing officers, as the President and Directors, are the substantial
party; and if they are citizens of the State which created the corporation, and the
other party is a citizen of some other State, the federal courts have jurisdiction, and the provisions of the judiciary act with regard to the removal of such
causes from State courts apply.
2. It is not material in such case that the corporation has an office and does a large
business in the State of which the other party is a citizen; nor that some of its
stockholders are citizens thereof.
3. It is to be presumed in the first instance that the governing officers of the corporation are citizens of the State which created it, and in which it does business.
4. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in a question of the
construction of the constitution, are conclusive upon the State courts.

WHEEDEN vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

This was a motion made on the part of the defendants, to remove
the record of this case into the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on petition filed under the
act of 1789, setting forth that the plaintiff was a citizen of Pennsylvania, and the defendant a citizen of New Jersey. Similar motions
were made in several other cases began at the same time against
the defendant, answers to the various petitions, by the different
plaintiffs, and counter affidavits by the defendant, were also filed.
The nature of these is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court,
which, after a full and able argument by
St. Geo. T. Campbell, for the motion,
Miller, G. i. Wharton, and .Drayton, contra, and
J. IT. Reed, in reply, was delivered January 7th, 1856, by
WOODWARD, J.-The Constitution of the United States, (Art. 3
sec. 2) extends the judicial power of the federal Union to various
classes of cases, and among others to all cases in law and equity
1between eitizens of different States." The 11th section of the Act
of Congress of 1789, commonly called the Judiciary Act, vests
original cognizance in the Circuit Courts, of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, five hundred dollars, and where "the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State ;" and the 12th section provides that if a suit
be commenced in a State court by a citizen of the State in which
the suit is brought, against a citizen of another State, and the
matter in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs,
to be made to appear to -the satisfaction of the court, and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such State
court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the
next Circuit Court, to be held in the district where the suit is pending, and offer good and sufficient surety for his appearance in said
court, and entering special bail if necessary, "it shall then be the
duty of the State court to accept the surety and proceed no further
in the cause," but the same is to proceed in the Circuit Court of
the United States, in the same manner as if it had been brought
there by original process.
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It will be observed that the legislative language, descriptive of
the parties who may sue or remove into the Circuit Court, is a little
more restricted than that employed in the constitution, but if any
difference of meaning be indicated by the difference in phraseology,
it is unimportant in the cause before me, for if this be a removable
case, it is because it is within the words of the legislature, and of
course within those of the constitution.
What, then, is the case? James C. Wheeden brought suit in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania against the Camden and Amboy
Railroad and Transportation Company, for the recovery of damages
claimed to exceed five hundred dollars, and which resulted, it is
understood, from the late calamity, well known as the "Burlington
disaster." The Company, at the time of appearing, filed a petition,
setting forth that they were a corporation solely created and established by laws of the State of New Jersey, and having their chief
place of business within the State of New Jersey, and that the corporation was and is a citizen of said State, and that the plaintiff is
a citizen of Pennsylvania. Security was tendered and the removal
of the cause into the Circuit Court was prayed for.
The plaintiff puts in an answer to the petition, and alleges that
the company own property and transact a large part of their business in the city of Philadelphia. Several of the specifications in
the plaintiff's answer are qualified and some of them contradicted
by counter affidavits on the part of the company; but I do not
consider the facts alleged in the answer, whether disputed, qualified
or admitted, as of much moment to the present inquiry, for the
defendant being a corporation created by the Legislature of New
Jersey, and having no vitality or existence, save such as is derived
from that source, cannot be, whatever their business transactions
in this State, a citizen of Pennsylvania in any sense of either the
constitution or the judiciary act. "That invisible, intangible and
artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate," if
capable of becoming a citizen of a State for any purpose, must be
made so by the legislative power of the State. It is impossible that
New Jersey should make a citizen of Pennsylvania, even of a natural
person, much less of an artificial. And if the legislative faculty of
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that State is incompetent for this purpose, a corporation existing
solely by her will, cannot make itself a citizen of Pennsylvania.
No amount of business carried on, or property held here, can naturalize such a corporation. Its rights amongst us are permissive
merely, resting entirely in the absence of prohibitory legislation.
That we regard every corporation " not holding its charter under
the laws of this Commonwealth," as foreign, may be seen by reference to the 3d section of our act of Assembly of 21st March, 1849,
(Brightly's Purdon, 169) which provides that suit may be brought
against "1any such foreign corporation" by process served
upon " any officer, agent, or engineer of such corporation, either
personally or by copy, or by leaving a certified copy at the office,
depot, or usual place of business of said corporation." It was under
this act of Assembly the present defendant was sued, as a foreign
corporation. The answer does not allege any legislative recognition
by Pennsylvania of this corporation defendant, and therefore, if all
that is alleged were admitted, it would not be a step in the process
of proving a Pennsylvania citizenship for it. We subject it to suit
through its agents when they are found here, and we seize, in execution of our judgments, any property it may have within our borders;
but in no sense or degree can it ever become a local institution,
except by express legislative recognition.
But further. If the facts alleged in the answer are insufficient
to prove a Pennsylvania citizenship, so also do they fail to disprove
this corporation a citizen of New Jersey. If it have a local habitation, it is in New Jersey, and, to borrow the language of Ch. J.
Taney, in the Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Peters, 588, it must
dwell in the place of its creation; and cannot migrate into another
sovereignty. But as natural persons, through the intervention of
agents, are continually making contracts in countries in which they
do not reside, and where they are not personally present when the
contract is made, so may this artificial person by its agents make
contracts within the scope of its limited powers in a sovereignty in
which it does not reside, provided such contracts are permitted to
be made by the laws of the place.
And as the natural person does not transfer his citizenship from
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one sovereignty to another by such dealings, neither does the artificial. Nor do such dealings constitute, for either the natural person or the corporation, a double citizenship, one in the place of the
domicil, and another where business is carried on through agencies.
It is obviously proper, therefore, for me to lay out of view, in the
further consideration of this case, all the business arrangements
and transactions which the answer charges the company with maintaining in Pennsylvania. A foreign corporation doing business in
this State becomes not thereby a citizen of Pennsylvania, and loses
not any citizenship it may have in the State of its creation.
But still the question remains-is this company a citizen of New
Jersey ? Incorporated solely by that State, doing business therein,
its principal officers resident there, and its railroad, the great instrument of all its operations, lying wholly in that State, this company
is a citizen of New Jersey in so far as an artificial being can become
such. If any company can be in the sense of the constitution a
citizen.of a sovereign State, the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company is a citizen of New Jersey, and the plaintiff being confessedly
a citizen of Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
would follow as a necessary consequence. The suit might have
been brought in that court in the first instance, and is removable
there at the instance of the defendant.
But can a corporation be a citizen? For general purposes it is
impossible. The rights and privileges guarantied to citizens in the
federal constitution are inconsistent with the nature, properties and
purposes of corporations. Take, for instance, that provision of the
fourth article, "that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." If
corporations created by State authority were held to be within the
provision, their rights and powers would no longer be measured by
the grants of their charters, but by the constitutional rights of an
American freeman; they would overrun State lines, seize upon
political power, and ultimately devour one another.
The framers of the federal Constitution were well acquainted with
corporations. They existed in England and in several of the
States, and whilst no power to create them was expressly delegated
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to Congress, no restraint was imposed on the power of the States
to multiply them indefinitely. They were left out of the federative
system altogether, and that, doubtless by design, and on good reason, and not by accident. So was the word citizen well understood
as it is now understood, to mean a human being-a natural person
capable of acting, contracting, suing and being sued without legislative aids-a person of whom allegiance is predicable, and who
may be guilty of treason. In all these points and many others,
corporations are distinguishable from citizens, and no body of men
probably were ever assembled on earth who understood the distinction better, or were more capable of expressing their thoughts
accurately, than the framers of the Constitution of the United States.
When they used the word citizen to define the character of the
parties who might resort to the judicial power of the Union, did
they then mean corporations ? The received rules of interpretation
would require us to understand the same word in the same sense
throughout the instrument, if not controlled in certain places by
the context, and if the word citizen, when used in the fourth article
did not include corporations, how, it might be asked, can it be
construed in the third article to embrace them ? There is nothing
in the context of either article to impart a shade of meaning to the
word different from the common understanding of its sense. It
would seem to me to mean the same thing in both articles, and in
both to mean natural and not artificial persons.
For these reasons, and others which it is not worth while to take
time to state, I should be very apt, if the question were new, to
reach the conclusions so repeatedly stated and ably defended by
the dissentient members of the Supreme Court of the United States
when cases involving the question have been before that tribunal;
but sitting here as a judge in a State court, I am not to follow dissenting opinions, nor, on a Constitutional question, my own ideas of
the meaning of the organic law, but am to take the instrument in
the sense in which it is received by the majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Among the judicial tribunals of the country, if not in other departments and places, that court is the supreme and final arbiter of
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questions under the federal Constitution. The respect entertained
for the members of that Bench makes the duty of following them
on a constitutional question, easy and pleasant, which the theory of
the goveanment makes imperative.
In the case of the Bank of the United &tatesvs. Deveaux, 5
Cranch, 61, decided in 1809, the record contained an averment
that the plaintiffs were citizens of the State of Pennsylvania, and
that the defendants were citizens of Georgia. The defendants
pleaded to the jurisdiction that the body corporate was not competent to sue in the Circuit Court of the United States. The
Supreme Court overruled the plea, and sustained the jurisdiction,
not on the ground that corporations were citizens, for this, Chief
Justice Marshall most emphatically denied, but on the ground that
the members of the corporation, who were natural persons, and the
substantial parties on the record, were citizens of Pennsylvania, and
the court felt itself authorized to look to the character of the individuals composing the corporation, for the purpose of sustaining a
jurisdiction which had been often exercised without question.
In Sullivan vs. -The ulton Steamboat Company, 6 Wheaton, 450,
the defendants were described as a corporate body, incorporated by
the Legislature of New York, and it was held that the court had
not jurisdiction.
The Bank of icksburg vs. Slocomb, 14 Peters, 60. Here a
Mississippi corporation was sued by a citizen of Louisiana, and the
successful plea to the jurisdiction was, that two of the corporators
were citizens of Louisiana.
That plea, admitted by the demurer, was held sufficient to oust
the jurisdiction. This case interprets that of the Bank vs. Deveaux,
where Ch. J. Marshall ruled that the court would look beyond the
charter to the members of the corporation, without defining what
was meant by members-whether corporators merely, or official
and governing members. Taking the two cases together, the doctrine is, that, if all the corporators are citizens of the State from
which the charter of incorporation is obtained, the corporation may
be sued in the Circuit Court by a citizen of another State, but if any
of them are citizens of the State to which the corporation belongs,

WHEEDEN vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

jurisdiction is denied. This case in 14 Peters also rules what has
been admitted in subsequent cases, that the act of Congress of 28th
February, 1839, wrought no change in the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts as respects the character of parties.
The doctrine deduced from these two cases (Deveaux's and Sbocomb's) is in exact accordance with that laid down by Chancellor
Kent, as the result of all the authorities (1 Com. 378) and by Judge
Story, in the Bank of Cumberland vs. Willis, 3 Sumner, 472. In
this case, a Bank incorporated by the State of Maine, sued a customer who was a citizen of Massachusetts, and was turned out of
the Circuit Court because a citizen of Boston was the owner of ten
shares of the capital stock of the Bank.
See also 1 Peters. 238; 3 Dallas7 382; 4 Dallas, 708, and 3
Cran. 267.
I come now to the case of the Louisville Railroad Company vs.
Letson, 2 Howard, 497.. Letson, a citizen of New York, sued in
the Circuit. Court of the United States for the District of South
Carolina, the Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company, a corporation created by and transacting business in the
State of South Carolina. The jurisdiction was objected to on
several grounds.
1st. That all the members of said corporation were not citizens
of South Carolina, but that two of them were citizens of North
Carolina.
2.
tion.

That South Carolina herself was a member of said corpora-

3d. That the Bank of Charleston, another South Carolina corporation , was a member of the corporation sued, and that two citizens of New York were members of the said Banking corporation.
4th. That the Charleston Insurance and Trust Company was
also a member of the corporation sued, and that three members of
said Trust Company were citizens of New York.
These objections were all overruled, the cause tried, and judgment rendered by the Circuit Court, for the plaintiff, and the judg-
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mert affirmed in the Supreme Court, after arguments by counsel,
which are remarkable for their fullness and ability.
Mr. Justice Wayne delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court,
and after reviewing and limiting the effect of prior decisions, indicated
the ground on which the decision in this case was altogether rested
by the following language: " It is, that a corporation created by
and doing business in a particular State, is to be deemed to all
intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an
inhabitant of the same State, for the purposes of its incorporation,
capable of being treated as a citizen of that State as much as a
natural person. Like a citizen, it makes contracts, and though in
regard to what it may do in some particulars, it differs from a natu.ral person, and in this especially, the manner in which it can sue
and be sued, it is substantially within the meaning of the law, a
citizen of the State which created it, and where its business is done,
for all the purposes of suing and being sued."
Here it will .be observed there was no looking beyond the charter
.to fix the citizenship of the members. Incorporation by and doing
business in a particular State, constitute citizenship "for all the
purposes of suing and being sued." These words seem to be added
by way of qualification, but when it is considered that the Constitution and Act of Congress use the word citizen in connection with
the judicial powers of the courts only for the purpose of defining
who may sue and be sued, it is apparent that the words of the
learned judge are no qualification of the constitutional and legislative rule.
The next case is 1arshall vs. The Baltimore and Ohio -ailroad
Company, 16 Howard, 31 4 -a suit by a citizen of Virginia against
a corporation which was described as a "body corporate by an
act of the General Assembly of Maryland," and without any averment as to the place of business or residence of officers or corporators. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was affirmed in the
Supreme Court by an opinion by Grier, Justice, who cited with
approbation, Letson's case, and the opinion of ir. Justice Catron
in Bundle vs. The Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, 14
Peters, 80.
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The point of distinction between Letson's case and that of Marshall is, that in the former it was averred of record that the corporation was doing business in the State which created it; in the latter it was not. In the former the language of the judge implies
that the corporation, in its artificial and legal character, is to be
regarded as a citizen for purposes of suit; in the latter that the
officers, who are curators, or trustees of the corporation, are the
substantial party in a suit, and that their residence and citizenship
determines the jurisdiction. In this respect the opinion in Marshall's
case is coincident with what Catron, Justice, said in Bwndle vs. The
Canal Company.
" My opinion is, and long has been," said the learned judge,
"that the mayor and aldermen of a city corporation, or the president and directors of a bank, or of a railroad company (and of other
similar corporations,) are the true parties that sue and are sued as
trustees and representatives of the constantly changing stockholders.
If the president and directors are citizens of the State where the
corporation was created, and the other party to the suit is a citizen
of a different State, or a citizen or subject of a foreign government,
then the courts of the United States can exercise jurisdiction under
the third article of the Constitution. In this sense I understood
Letson's case, and assented to it when the decision was made; and
so it is understood now."
These views were repeated by Judge Catron, in a dissenting
opinion, in Marshall's case, and his dissent in that case was rested
on the ground that there was no averment on record, of the citizenship of the president and directors. According to Mr. Justice
Grier, speaking for thb majority, this is to be inferred from an
averment of the act of incorporation.
If Letson's case is to be received as Judge Catron understood it,
the result of all the cases, the earlier taken in connection with the
modern, may be stated thus:1. A corporation is not per s a citizen within the meaning of
the third article of the Constitution.
2. But when it sues or is sued, the governing officers, by whatever name called, are the substantial party, and if they are citizens
20
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of the State which created the corporation, and the other party is a
citizen of another State, the federal courts have jurisdiction.
This is according to Judge Marshall's principle, of looking beyond
the charter to the citizenship of members cf the corporation, but it
defines the members to be looked to differently from what was done
in the Vickslurg Bank vs. Slocum. It is no longer the stockholders
or corporators in general, but the president and directors, to whose
citizenship the court will look.
This rapid review of the cases is sufficient to show that, if the
question before me had arisen whilst the doctrine obtained in the
Supreme Court, which was expounded in the Vicksburg Bank case
the fact alleged here, and not controverted, that some of the stockholders of the Camden and Amboy Company are resident in and
citizens of Pennsylvania, would be decisive against the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court. That doctrine passed into the text of Chancellor Kent and other writers, and many cases were ruled upon it.
It wits, nevertheless, subject to serious objections, as may be seen by
the criticisms of counsel and judges in subsequent cases, and particularly in Letson's case. Whether the doctrine that was substituted for it will not be found more objectionable, and the court be
brought to the broad ground of declaring either that corporations,
as such, are citizens within the meaning of the constitution, or that
they are not citizens, and cannot be parties to litigation in the
federal courts, are subjects' not fit for present speculation, and
which must await the developments of judicial history.
My present duty is to apply the law as I find it settled now.
And, as I understand it, the fact that some of the stockholders of
the company reside in the same State as the plaintiff, is a circumstance of no importance whatever. Though they may be affected
by the judgment in the case, they are not to be considered parties
to the record. Th; president and directors are the substantial
parties sued, under the shadow of the corporate name, and I am to
presume them citizens of New Jersey, because it is shown that the
company was incorporated by that State, and is doing business.
therein. Nor is that presumption rebutted by their holding property and transacting business through agencies in Pennsylvania.
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The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court results, therefore, out of the
citizenship of these governing members of the corporation.
Under the act of Congress, it is to be made to appear to the
satisfaction of this court, that the matter in dispute exceeds five
hundred dollars, exclusive of costs. An affidavit to that effect is
appended to the petition of the company, which, though objected
to, I deem sufficient, and I also consider the surety offered, "good
and sufficient."
It is therefore ordered that the prayer of the petitioner be granted,
that the security be accepted, and that this court will proceed no
further in the cause.
Let a like order be entered in the case of Thomas Finlay and
the other plaintiffs against the same defendants.

District Court of the United States for Maryland.
WALLIS VS. CHESNEY.
1. The admiralty has not jurisdiction of a libel for freight on merchandise carried
in a canal-boat, about two hundred and fifty miles by canal, and only about forty
miles on tide-water.
2. To give jurisdiction on a contract of affreightment, the principal or chief part of
the service must be under the contract to be performed on tide-water.

Libel for freight on coal.

Plea to the jurisdiction of the court.

The following opinion was given by
GILES, J.-The facts of this case are as follows :-The coal was
brought in a canal-boat from Pittston, Luzerne county, Pennsylvania,
on the canal to Port Deposit; and from that point the canal-boat
was towed by a steamboat to Baltimore. It was brought on the
canal about two hundred and fifty miles, and on tide-water about
forty miles. Is the contract to carry this coal a maritime contract,
over which this court has jurisdiction? I think not. The contract
is entire, and four-fifths of the distance this coal was carried, was
on a canal, clearly beyond the jurisdiction of this court.
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Now, the Supreme Court, in the case of Te Lexington, on page
392 of 6 Howard, say, "But if the substantialpart of the service
under the contract is to be performed beyond tide-waters, or if the
contract relates exclusively to the interior navigation and trade of
a State, jurisdiction is disclaimed." I understand the court to mean,
by the word substantial,the principal or chief part of the service.
I will briefly notice the cases in this court, to which I have been
referred by the proctor for the libellant. In the case of The Telegraph, which was a collision which took place on the Chesapeake
and Delaware Canal, the Circuit Court reversed the decree of the
District Court, for the want of jurisdiction.
The case of Ware &. Weston vs. The Baltimore Steam Towing
Company, (in which a decree was given for libellants,) was a case
for freight on goods brought from Philadelphia to Baltimore. The
goods were carried down the Delaware to the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, and through that canal, and on the Chesapeake bay
and Patapsco river, to Baltimore; more than three-fourths of the
distance was on tide-water, and the goods were carried on a vessel
built and used for transportation on tide-water.
The case of The York River Steamboat Company, grew out of
a collision which took place on the Chesapeake bay, near the mouth
of the Patapsco river. The steamer ran against and injured a
canal-boat at that point.
Now, in cases of tort, the locality determines the jurisdiction;
and as the collision happened on tide-waters, this court clearly had
jurisdiction of the case.
I will sign a decree, dismissing the libel filed in this case, for
want of jurisdiction.

GORDON vs. SHALLCROSS.

Zn the District Court of _Philadelphia,1855.
GORDON VS. SHALLOROSS.

Though a mortgagee, on a sale of the mortgaged premises under a prior encumbrance, is entitled to receive (besides the principal) interest out of the surplus
proceeds only to the day of sale, yet it still continues to run on the debt secured,
until the actual receipt of the money on the final distribution. Hence, in such
case, the creditor may subsequently recover in an action on the bond, any interest
which has accrued between these two periods, notwithstanding that the mortgage
itself has been satisfied.

This was an action of scire facias on a judgment entered on a
bond.
Rule for a new trial on the part of the plaintiff.
The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
n:ARE, J.-The plaintiff in this case is the holder of a bond and
mortgage executed by the defendant. The mortgaged premises
were sold under a prior mortgage, and the proceeds of the sale sent
to an auditor for distribution, by whose award the surplus remaining
after the payment of the first mortgage, was finally paid to the
plaintiff under the second. This payment was not made until
nearly two years after the sale; and the question now before us is,
whether interest ceased on the amount thus paid, from the time
-when the land was sold, or continued to accrue until the actual
receipt of the money, aiid can now be recovered under a scirefacias,
which has been issued on a judgment entered some years ago on the
bond.
The only mode in which interest could be recovered on a judgment at common law, was by an action on the judgment. The
remedy by execution was limited to the amount of the judgment
itself, (fodgdon vs. Rodgdon, 2 N. Hamp. 169; Frenchvs. Eaton,
15 Id. 337;) and an attempt to use the execution to compel the
payment of interest was an abuse of process, for which all the
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persons concerned might be made liable in damages. TFatson vs.
.Fuller,6 Johnson, 284. If the sheiiff made more than was necessary to pay the judgment, the creditor could not take the interest
out of the surplus, if the debtor were arrested on a ca. sa., he was
entitled to be discharged on paying the bare principal. Allen vs.
Adams, 15 Vermont, 16. The farthest point to which the law
went, and that not without difficulty, was to give interest down to
the time of verdict or judgment, (Robinson vs. Bland, 2 Burrow,
1077 ;) and equity, in this respect equally narrow with the law,
refused to give compensation in interest for the loss occasioned by
a delay in the execution of its decrees. Creuze vs. Hunter, 2 Yes. jr.
162. Even when judgment was entered for the penalty of a bond,
and stood as security for the real debt, the execution was restricted
to the principal and interest due at the time of levy. And although
one of the earliest statutes of this State gives a right to interest
under a levy, until sale or satisfaction, yet the Supreme Court have
said that the right thus given stops with the sale. Nothing more
can be recovered on an execution, either at common lbw or under
the statute, than is due when it is executed; and it is hardly necessary to say, that no second action can be brought, or subsequent
writ issued, for what is thus denied in the first. If the creditor
were entitled to anything more, the law would permit him to
recover it at once, without exposing him to the delay, and the
debtor to the expense of two proceedings, to accomplish what
ought to be done in one. No precedent has been produced for
such a course; and we may safely conclude, that what has not been
attempted, cannot be done. The simplicity of the common law
would not have tolerated a second action or execution, for a mere
incident, where the record showed a fu I satisfaction of the principal, and its logic would have perceived, that if the loss occasioned
by the delay in proceeding under one writ, could be made good by
issuing another, the same reason would justify a recourse to a third,
as a means of compensation for the loss of time during the execution of the second, and thus end in an indeterminate and indefinite
series of proceedings. When a writ which expresses the full purpose of the-judgment, and is in fact as well as name, the execution

GORDON vs. SHALLCROSS.

of that which the law has resolved, is once fully executed, there is
an end of the judgment, and of course of the original cause of
action, which is well known to be merged in the judgment.
This is well settled, where the execution is levied on personal
property, and must be equally true when real estate is in question.
Joe La Vergue vs. Evertson, 1 Paige, 182; Mower vs. Kip, 6 Id.
89. "The legal effect of the sheriff's taking the goods of the
defendant in execution, to the amount or value of the debt, is a
discharge of the defendant from the judgment and all further
execution, although he does not satisfy the plaintiff or return the
writ, and will be a bar to a scirefacias on the judgment or a second
execution," per Kennedy, J., in Quin vs. Walton, 6 Wharton, 452,
464. The sale made in this case, was consequently a bar to the
recovery of interest on the mortgage, from the moment of the sale;
and had it been made under the bond, it would have been an extinguishment of the bond and perhaps of the mortgage, which is a
mere security for the bond. For as the sum received by the sheriff,
was sufficierit to pay both principal and interest at the time when
he received it, and as payment to him is, as Mr. Justice Kennedy
remarks, equivalent to payment to the creditor, the subsequent
delay would have been the creditor's misfortune, and would have
afforded no ground for surcharging the debtor. But the sale took
place not under the bond, but the mortgage; and the question
arises, whether the creditor is to be deprived of his interest on the
debt, by a-proceeding which, however effectual as an extinguishment
of the security held for its payment, was not an extinguishment of
the debt itself, and did not enure as actual payment, for several
years afterwards.
The arguments on either side of this question are so nearly
balanced, that if it rested solely on argument, there might be some
room for a difference of opinion. It has been said, on the one
hand, that interest, which is the only and often inadequate compensation, for the delay and inconvenience occasioned by the non-payment of the debt, ought to continue as long as the creditor is kept
out of his money, instead of terminating with an illusory payment
into the hands of the sheriff, from which no real benefit may be
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derived until long afterwards. That although the delay be the
delay of the law, yet that it originates in the wrong of the debtor,
in not paying the debt when it falls due, instead of waiting for the
compulsion of legal process, and that whatever the rule may be
when technical difficulties intervene, and when the record is encumbered with a prior execution on the same judgment, the plaintiff
should not be precluded from obtaining actual as well as nominal
satisfaction, when this objection does not exist, and when the only
barrier to a full and equitable compensation, is a proceeding in
another suit. It may be contended on the other han ., that how-ever numerous the securities, the cause of action is but one ;-that
the bond and the mortgage are different names and remedies for the
same debt; that although the mortgage may be but an accessory,.
and the bond the principal, yet that whatever would have been
satisfaction if recovered on the principal, must be equally so when
recovered on the security held for its payment; that if the money
had been paid over to the creditor, as soon as it came into the
hands of the law, or the sheriff who represents the law, the obligation of the debt would have been at an end; and that the delay
ought not to prejudice the debtor, because the act or delay of the
law prejudices no man-which does not mean that the law's delay
is no evil, but that it is an evil to him only who is delayed; that
the right of action on the bond, is necessarily suspended by the
receipt of the whole sum due upon it, at the time of the sale under
the execution issued on the mortgage, and a cause of action once
gone, is gone forever; that it is admitted on all hands, that if the
proceeds of an execution on a mortgage are more than enough to
pay the debt, interest and costs due when the sale is made, the
surplus cannot be appropriated to the payment of after-accruing
interest on the bond, but must be returned to the mortgagor, and
that the law, which abhors circuity of action, will not permit the
creditor to institute a subsequent proceeding to recover that which
it has itself restored to the debtor. In this position of the question,
we are glad to find a preponderating authority on that side, to which
the opinion of the court inclines in princip'e. It was held, in
The Carlisle Bank vs. Barnett, 8 W. & S. 248, that when a mort-
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gage is transferred as collateral security for a judgment, and the
amount of the judgment made by a sale under the mortgage, but
withheld from the creditor during the time consumed in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale, an execution may be issued
subsequently on the judgment, for the interest which has accrued
during the delay thus occasioned. In this case, the mortgage had
no connection with the judgment, until transferred as security for
its payment, while in that now before us, both were parts of the
same transaction. We think, however, that this distinction makes
no diflbrence in poinL of principle. A mortgage is equally a collateral security for the debt, whether given at the period when the
debt originates or subsequently, and whether executed directly
between the debtor and creditor, or made by a third person, and
afterwards assigned to the creditor for the purpose of securing the
debt. In both cases, the end in view is the same; in neither,
should it be defeated by the proper use of the means.
The rule for a new trial is therefore made absolute.

_Biglth Judicial District, Iowa-S tcott County District Court,
July, 1855.
ALLEN IARRISON & POTTER vs. POPE & STONEBRAKER.
1. Where a mercantile firm, having executed a promissory note, and after the maturity thereof, one of said firm, at the request of the payees, ivho demanded payment or security, gave to said payees another note signed by himself and a third
person, payable at a subsequent time, secured by a mortgage on real estate, to
the full amount of the original claim; such original indebtedness is not thereby
extinguished, unless by the express agreement of the parties at the time, or that
such transaction Was understood by tbem to have been in full satisfaction of the
antecedent liability.
2. A person having in his possession negotiable notes, bonds, &c. as collateral security, is not confined exclusively to that security for the purpose of liquidating his
demand, but may, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, maintain his
action against the debtor on the original claim.

On demurrer to plea of puis darrein continuance.
TUTHILL W. H., J. - It has long been a settled doctrine, that
the acceptance of a negotiable note for an antecedent debt, will not
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extinguish such debt, unless it is expressly agreed that it is received
as payment; and in New York it has been held that the giving
a promissory note by one of several partners, or joint debtors,
for a demand antecedently due from all, will not extinguish their
liability, though the creditor expressly accept the note in satisfaction.
W1aydell vs. LJewis, 5 Hill, 448.
A promissory note is only the evidence of an account stated,
and a defence at the present day, grounded on the fact that the
-defendant had met the plaintiff, acknowledged the debt to be of
.1 certain amount, and promised to pay it, would be deemed quite
absurd, if set up in bar to an action on the original indebtedness.
.Zffgtes vs. Wheeler, 8 Cowen, 77.
In this case, however, it is contended that the plaintiffs, by
receiving from Robert H. Pope, one of the defendants, two pro,missory notes, signed by Angeline H. Pope and said Robert H.
Pope, secured by a deed of trust on certain real estate, thereby
released and discharged Stonebraker, the other defendant, from
any and all liability to pay the original indebtedness. This reasoning is doubtless derived from the doctrine of Novation, as known
in the civil law, (Inst. Lib, 8, tit. 30, De Novatione; see Cooper's
Justinian, 297 ;) and the rule is there laid down, that when a second
contract is intended and so expressed by the parties, it operates as
a dissolution of the first: and in France, where the civil law is
adopted, one of several debtors who are jointly bound, may be substituted for all. Poth. No. 564. But this doctrine is unknown to
the common law; and even the French rule declares that a novation shall not be allowed, unless the intention be so evident as to
admit of no doubt.
It is a well settled doctrine that accord is not satisfaction, and
cannot be made so on the principles of the common law, except by
a contract of a higher nature; and where a novation is alleged by
the acceptance of the notes of a third person, it will be necessary
to prove an express agreement, to the effect that the original debt
was meant to be extinguished, before it can so be held by the
courts; otherwise the first contract is deemed valid, and the second
regarded as an accession to it, or, in common parlance, as collateral
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8ecurity; and although, in general, a simple contract debt is merged
in a bond or covenant taken for, or to secure the claim: because, in
legal contemplation, the specialty is an instrument of a higher
nature, and affords a higher security and a better remedy than the
original demand presented, but this does not h6ld even in favor of a
surety by simple contract, if it appear on the face of the subsequent deed that it was intended only as additional or collateral
security, and there is nothing in the deed itself expressly inconsistent with such intention.
The acceptance of a mortgage, with power to sell the mortgaged
property on default of payment, does not destroy the right to recover the original debt. The simple contract is not merged in the
mortgage, nor is it thereby extinguished as long as it remains unsatisfied; and the reason given for such rule is, that it is not
necessary that a note or bond should be given to preserve a debt,
as the debt exists and continues in full force without such security.
The mortgage is considered to be given as collateral security, and
does not merge the demand. The one is the principal,the other
the incident, and the latter can never merge the. former.
Where negotiable notes, bonds, &c., are transferred or delivered
to a creditor, and taken by him as collateral security for an existing debt, it is looked upon as a pledge merely, and such creditor is
not confined exclusively to that security, but may, unless there is
some agreement to the contrary, maintain an action against the
debtor on the original claim; or if the collateral be negotiable
notes or obligations that have matured, he may proceed to collect
the same, and apply the proceeds on such original debt. Whitwell
vs. Brigham, 19 Pick. 117.
By the plea puis darrein continuance, it is contended that because one of the joint debtors gave security that the debt should be
liquidated at a subsequent period, the other debtor was thereby
released. This conclusion the court cannot consider as warranted
from the statement of facts in the pleadings; and although the
question might arise, whether the facts therein recited do not abate
the present action, or extend the time of payment of the debt, if

